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Terrorism and the New Criminal Process
John Parry
Abstract
Executive and legislative actions after 9/11 demonstrate a shift in the way the
federal government combats terrorism. Traditional law enforcement entities have
been given new powers, and military and intelligence personnel have taken on a
new prominence. Criminal prosecutions are still being brought against persons
suspected of terrorist activity, but the government seems less willing to accord
criminal trials a central role in anti-terror efforts. In short, we are seeing the
creation of a “new criminal process” for terrorism, a process that in many cases
bypasses federal courts and operates wholly outside the territorial boundaries of
the United States.
All of these actions, moreover, react to the perceived emergency created by the
9/11 attacks. Government officials have argued that a state of emergency exists
and – critically – that it is unclear when the emergency will end. Other public
figures and the media have largely agreed. “Everything has changed” has become
the common theme, and the new criminal process provides a legal ratification of
that change – a legal structure for a state of emergency.
This essay considers the new criminal process and the perception of emergency
out of which it grows from a variety of angles. Although I think the federal gov-
ernment has shifted too far in favor of military and other solutions to terrorism
at the expense of traditional criminal processes, my position rest upon a chain
of reasoning and a baseline that the new criminal process contests. That deeper
contest and its implications are the focus of this essay. To that end, I describe the
attributes for the new criminal process, and provide the arguments for and against
the traditional and new criminal processes. I also consider the legality of the new
criminal process and conclude that it comports with constitutional norms (which
may say more about the malleability of constitutional norms than anything else).
The underlying assertion of this essay is that the new criminal process may not
be so new. Rather, it may be the latest step in a broad shift in our approach to
governing, where pervasive authority is increasingly valued over the constraints
of law. This change brings with it modification and dilution of rights, but also the
possibility of their expansion within the context of also-expanded state power. Nor
is this change occurring without justification. Terrorism is a real policy issue, and
rational, liberal-minded people support increased state power to counter the threat.
Be that as it may, the critical point is that we are experiencing the modification of
the processes by which our government investigates and imposes punishment on
people, and the fact that some of these processes arise in the context of the war
on terror means, not that those processes are about fighting terrorism, but rather
that those processes – the new criminal process – inevitably will and have already
begun to generalize.
draft of September 16, 2005 – please do not quote or cite without permission 
 
Terrorism and the New Criminal Process 
John T. Parry
I. STRUCTURING A STATE OF EMERGENCY 
On November 13, 2001 – just over two months after the September 
11 attacks – President George W. Bush issued an executive order that 
authorized the detention and trial of non-citizens “at an appropriate location 
designated by the Secretary of Defense outside or within the United States” 
if “there is reason to believe that such individual” (1) was a member of al-
Qaeda, (2) had engaged in or aided acts of international terrorism intended 
to cause “injury or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national 
security, foreign policy, or economy,” or (3) had harbored someone in the 
first two categories.1
Under the authority of the November 13 order, the government 
began to use the Guantanamo Bay naval base, as well as other locations 
inside and outside the U.S., to house individuals detained during military 
and intelligence operations in Afghanistan and other places.  Lawyers at the 
White House, the Justice Department, the State Department, and the 
Defense Department drafted and debated a series of legal memoranda on the 
application to these detainees of the Geneva Conventions, other sources of 
international law, and domestic constitutional and statutory law.  
Ultimately, the President concluded the Geneva Conventions did not apply 
to members of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and suspected “terrorists,” but he 
directed that all persons detained by U.S. armed forces be treated 
“humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military 
necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.”2
With respect to interrogations, administration officials concluded 
 
 Visiting Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School; Associate Professor, University of 
Pittsburgh School of Law.  This essay began as a paper for the Working Group on Liberty 
and Security in an Age of Proliferation and Terror, sponsored by the Ridgway Center for 
International Security Studies of the University of Pittsburgh’s Graduate School of Public 
and International Affairs.   I am grateful for the comments of Bill Keller, Lisa Nelson, and 
the other members of the working group. 
1 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 
Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU 
GHRAIB 25 (Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel eds. 2005). 
2 Memorandum for the Vice President, et al. (Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE 
PAPERS, supra note __, at 134. 
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that international and domestic law places few constraints on the aggressive 
interrogation of suspected terrorists.  The Convention Against Torture and a 
federal statute prohibit torture – defined as the intentional infliction of 
severe mental or physical pain or suffering – and international law also 
prohibits cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.  In 
addition, the Constitution limits the government’s ability to use violence, as 
with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the due process clauses to 
prevent state action that “shocks the conscience.”3 In August 2002, the 
Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) concluded that these 
prohibitions permit interrogation that is not specifically intended to cause 
severe pain and that “severe pain” for purposes of the ban on torture means 
only pain of a level “that would ordinarily be associated with a sufficiently 
serious condition or injury such as death, organ failure, or serious 
impairment of bodily functions.”4 On December 30, 2004, OLC issued a 
new memorandum that repudiated the definition of severe pain in the 
August memorandum in favor of a definition that looks to whether the 
underlying conduct is “extreme and outrageous.”5
For its part, the Defense Department convened a “working group on 
detainee interrogations” in response to the President’s orders and requests 
from commanders in the field.  The working group reviewed the law of 
interrogation and proposed a list of 35 acceptable interrogation techniques 
that could be used on detainees held outside the U.S.6 Secretary of Defense 
 
3 For a description and assessment of the strength of the international law and constitutional 
protections against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
see John T. Parry, “Just for Fun”: Understanding Torture and Understanding Abu Ghraib,
1 J. NAT’L SEC. L & POL. ___ (forthcoming 2005). 
4 Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzalez, Counsel to the 
President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogations under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A 
(Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note __, at 172; Letter from John 
C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to The Honorable 
Alberto R. Gonzales (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note __, at 
218.  For the argument that traditional criminal law principles would allow executive 
officials to raise a necessity defense if prosecuted for the illegal use of coercive 
interrogation, see John T. Parry and Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected Terrorists: 
Should Torture be an Option?, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 743 (2002).  For arguments that nearly 
all interrogation is coercive, that is it not easily disentangled from other forms of state 
coercion and state violence, and that state violence is simply part of what modern nation 
states – including the U.S. – do, see Parry, Just for Fun, supra note __. 
5 Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, 
Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004). 
6 Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: 
Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations (Apr. 4, 2003), 
reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note __, at 286. 
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Donald Rumsfeld ultimately authorized 24 of those techniques (generally 
the least severe) for use at Guantanamo Bay, with the proviso that 4 of them 
could only be used in cases of “military necessity” but that he might 
approve additional techniques on written request in individual cases.7 The 
techniques used at Guantanamo migrated to Afghanistan and Iraq and 
mingled with aggressive methods adopted by troops on the ground as 
commanders shared information and interrogators moved from one location 
to another.8
Responding to the President’s order on trying non-citizens suspected 
of terrorism, the Defense Department also issued a series of “Military 
Commission Instructions” that defined both the procedures to be used by 
military tribunals and the crimes triable before them.9 Among other things, 
the rules provide that evidence may be admitted if it “would have probative 
value to a reasonable person” – a departure from the more exacting 
standards of the Federal Rules of Evidence.10 The rule also seems to 
suggest that evidence obtained through coercive interrogation may be used, 
subject to any constraints imposed by federal courts in subsequent habeas 
corpus proceedings to the extent such proceedings are available.11 As of the 
date of this essay, several persons have been designated for trial before the 
commissions and counsel have been assigned to some of them, but no trials 
 
7 Donald Rumsfeld, Memorandum for the Commander, U.S. Southern Command (Apr. 16, 
2003), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note __, at 360. 
8 Final report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations (Aug. 2004), 
reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note __, at 908, 923-26. 
9 32 C.F.R. parts 9-14.  For draft and final versions of the military commission instructions 
and related documents, see National Institute of Military Justice, Military Commission 
Instructions Sourcebook  (2003-04).  The National Institute of Military Justice website has 
extensive and frequently updated resources on military commissions.  See 
http://www.nimj.com/Home.asp. 
10 32 C.F.R. § 9.6(d)(1). 
11 The regulations say nothing about review by federal courts and instead provide that 
appeals will go to the President or Secretary of Defense for a “final decision” (32 C.F.R. § 
9.6(h)(6)).  Former White House Counsel and current Attorney General Alberto Gonzales 
stated that habeas would be available “for any defendant with a U.S. nexus” – that is, those 
arrested, detained, or tried in the U.S.  Vernon Loeb and Susan Schmidt, U.S. Wants Enemy 
Leaders Turned Over if Captured, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2001, A22.  The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004), however, appears to hold that federal 
courts have habeas corpus jurisdiction so long as they have jurisdiction over a prisoner’s 
custodians.  In dissent, Justice Scalia asserted that this holding “permits an alien captured 
in a foreign theater of active combat to bring a [habeas] petition against the Secretary of 
Defense,” id. at 2706, and one can legitimately wonder whether the Court really meant to 
create such a sweeping right of access to federal courts and what the scope of review in 
such cases would be.   
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have taken place.  Instead, debate continues within the administration over 
the rights of detainees and whether the current military commission rules 
are appropriate.12 
In addition, the administration expanded the use of already existing 
practices.  First, prosecutors have enforced relatively minor provisions of 
the immigration laws more strictly in order to detain, interrogate, and 
ultimately remove illegal immigrants deemed suspicious – usually Muslims 
or people of Arab ethnicity.13 Second, prosecutors have used the federal 
material witness statute to arrest and imprison suspicious individuals who 
may have information relevant to grand jury investigations into terrorist 
activity.14 
Third, the administration expanded the already existing practice of 
“rendition” – the informal transfer of a person from one country to another 
for purposes of trial or interrogation.  Although federal immigration and 
international extradition statutes govern executive efforts to move aliens 
and citizens from the United States to another country, those statutes do not 
apply to the efforts of U.S. officials overseas to transfer or encourage the 
transfer of a person from one foreign country to another foreign country.  
News reports have also suggested that suspected terrorists were “rendered” 
to countries that would use torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
interrogation techniques that U.S. officials were unwilling to use directly.15 
Finally, the CIA has apparently detained and interrogated suspected 
terrorists and other persons outside the United States, independent from the 
military or domestic law enforcement.16 The CIA is not specifically 
 
12 Tim Golden, U.S. Drafts Plan to Strengthen Detainees Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 
2005, A1; Tim Golden, Administration Officials Split Over Stalled Military Tribunals,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2004. 
13 See, e.g., Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1576-80 
(2002) (describing some of these initiatives). 
14 See Ricardo J. Bascuas, The Unconstitutionality of ‘Hold Until Cleared’: Reexamining 
the Material Witness Detentions in the Wake of the September 11th Dragnet, __ VAND. L. 
REV. __ (2005). 
15 For discussion of these issues, see John T. Parry, The Shape of Modern Torture: 
Extraordinary Rendition and Ghost Detainees, 6 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. ___ (forthcoming 
2005).  See also Committee on International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of 
the City of New York and the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York 
University School of Law, Torture by Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable 
to “Extraordinary Renditions” (2004). 
16 See Parry, The Shape of Modern Torture, supra note __.  See also Michael Hirsh, et al., 
Aboard Air CIA, MSNBC.COM, Apr. 6, 2005, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6999272/site/newsweek/; Josh White, Army Documents 
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included in President Bush’s “humane treatment” directive, and OLC’s 
August 2002 memorandum is widely viewed as intended to give the CIA 
considerable room to choose among potential interrogation tactics and 
practices for these “ghost detainees.”  A footnote in the December 30, 2004 
OLC opinion indicates that OLC has prepared other memoranda on 
interrogation that have not been made public and that the conclusions in 
those memoranda remain valid.17 Put plainly, it appears reasonable to 
conclude that the CIA is operating a parallel detention system, that coercive 
interrogation is part of that system, and that the existence of this system and 
the use of these techniques has been validated by classified legal 
memoranda and policy decisions. 
Although it has conducted little oversight of the administration’s 
actions, Congress has not been idle.  On September 18, 2001, Congress 
passed an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) that empowered 
the president “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any 
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such 
nations, organizations or persons.”18 
On October 26, 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act became law.19 The 
PATRIOT Act expands the powers of law enforcement officials to 
investigate criminal activity, whether or not that activity is defined as 
“terrorist” or not.  Among other things, the provisions of the Act 
loosen the restrictions on the government’s use of electronic 
surveillance, loosen the secrecy that attaches to grand jury 
deliberations, add to its authority to address money 
laundering, give it additional procedural power in certain 
 
Shed Light on CIA ‘Ghosting,’ WASH. POST, March 24, 2005, A15; Human Rights Watch, 
The United States’ Disappeared’: The CIA’s Long-Term ‘Ghost Detainees’ (Oct. 2004). 
17 Memorandum for James B. Comey, supra note __, at 2 n. 8 (“we have reviewed this 
office’s prior opinions addressing issues involving treatment of detainees and do not 
believe that any of their conclusions would be different under the standards set forth in this 
memorandum”).  For a comprehensive analysis of the December 30, 2004 OLC 
memorandum, with particular attention to the CIA, see Martin Lederman, “Understanding 
the OLC Torture Memos,” available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/01/understanding-
olc-torture-memos-part-i.html.  
18 Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
19 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 
(2001).  
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kinds if immigration matters, and facilitate cooperation 
between government agents focused on intelligence gathering 
and those whose goal is arrest and prosecution.20 
Several of the Act’s provisions expire on December 31, 2005, and debate is 
underway on the administration’s efforts to renew or make permanent many 
of those powers. 
The Homeland Security Act became law on November 25, 2002.  
Part of the Act abolishes the Immigration and Naturalization Service and 
replaces it with a Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services within 
the new Department of Homeland Security.21 The goal is to increase 
cooperation between the immigration bureaucracy and other agencies such 
as the Customs Service and Border Patrol in order to enhance the 
government’s ability to secure borders and prevent the entry of terrorists 
into the country.  In 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act, which created a Director of National 
Intelligence, made some provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act permanent, 
and generally sought to increase the tools available to law enforcement and 
the level of cooperation among the various entities engaged in anti-crime 
and anti-terror activities.22 
These statutes join an array of already-existing legislation designed 
to combat – and, for that matter, define – “terrorism” and other 
emergencies.23 Worth noting, as well, is that Congress has rejected some of 
 
20 NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 10 (2nd ed. 2005). 
21 Pub. L. No. 107-296, ___ Stat. ___ (2002). 
22 Pub. L. No. 108-458, ___ Stat. ___ (2004).  For a good summary of the Act, see 
ABRAMS, supra note __, at 33-39. 
23 Significant earlier emergency legislation includes the National Emergencies Act of 1976, 
50 U.S.C. § 1601, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702, 
and the Non-Detention Act of 1971, 18 U.S.C. 4001(a) (preventing imprisonment or 
detention of citizens “except pursuant to an Act of Congress”).  Other statutes abound.  
According to one study, by 1974 there were 470 statutes providing some kind of 
emergency authority.  Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 
YALE L.J. 1408 (1989).  For additional recent legislation that has created “an alternate 
system of justice” for terrorism, see Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules, 112 YALE L.J. ____, 
1017-18 (2003).  For a list of federal anti-terror legislation, see ABRAMS, supra note __, at 
7-8.  On the problem of defining “terrorism,” see Alex P. Schmid, The Response Problem 
as a Definition Problem, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 7-13 (Alex P. Schmid & 
Ronald D. Crelinsten eds. 1993), and A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: 
Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change 48-49 (Dec. 2004), 
available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf.  The definitional problem reflects a 
more serious theoretical problem with the idea of terrorism to the extent it is conceived of – 
as it necessarily is in this context – as violence against hegemonic modern states or their 
allies that themselves employ violence and other forms of power on a global scale.  I seek 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art33
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the administration’s proposals for greater executive authority and may pull 
back further in years to come.  My narrative here, in other words, should not 
be mistaken as simply a story about greater executive power. 
Taken together, these executive and legislative actions demonstrate 
a shift in the way the federal government combats terrorism.  Traditional 
law enforcement entities have been given new powers that have long been 
on the government’s wish list, both for anti-terror and for ordinary law 
enforcement purposes.  Military and intelligence personnel have taken on a 
new prominence.  Criminal prosecutions are still being brought against 
persons suspected of terrorist activity, but the government seems less 
willing to accord criminal trials a central role in anti-terror efforts.  In short, 
the events of 9/11 crystallized a “new criminal process” for terrorism, a 
process that in many cases bypasses federal courts and operates wholly 
outside the territorial boundaries of the United States. 
All of these actions, moreover, react to the perceived emergency 
created by the 9/11 attacks.  Government officials have argued that a state 
of emergency exists and – critically – that it is unclear when the emergency 
will end.  Other public figures and the media have largely agreed.  
“Everything has changed” has became the common theme, and the new 
criminal process provides a legal ratification of that change – a legal 
structure, that is, for a state of emergency.  But a perception of emergency 
should not be equated with panic.  Many of the components of the new 
criminal process were carefully thought out, and the executive branch has 
not simply assumed or been given martial law-like powers.  Instead, the 
new criminal process is a deliberate, sturdy, and evolving construct for what 
are arguably exceptional times. 
This essay considers the new criminal process and the perception of 
emergency out of which it grows from a variety of angles.  My view is that 
the federal government has shifted too far in favor of military and other 
solutions to terrorism at the expense of traditional criminal processes.  
Terrorism is more than aggravated crime, but traditional processes should 
remain the presumption because they are more familiar, fairer, better 
supported by developed legal doctrine, and more in accord with separation 
 
to sidestep these issues for purposes of this essay, primarily by taking seriously and 
assessing on their terms the claims that U.S. officials are making about terrorism.  I also 
put to one side the claim that terrorism can be justified.  On a purely theoretical level, it 
surely can be.  But the justification inquiry is inevitably the product of contestable value 
choices, and I cannot imagine a U.S. court or jury that would accept a necessity claim in an 
actual case and thereby validate the choices that led to terrorism.  See John T. Parry, 
Collective and Individual Responsibility for Acts of Terrorism, in UNDERSTANDING EVIL:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 109-10 (Margaret Sönser Breen ed. 2003). 
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of powers values.  I also see traditional criminal processes as part of a more 
restrained model for responding to the risk of terrorism we are likely to 
experience for the foreseeable future.  That said, my views rest upon a chain 
of reasoning and a baseline that the new criminal process contests, and that 
deeper contest and its implications – rather than simple normative claims – 
are the focus of this essay. 
II. WAR, CRIME, AND CHANGE 
Choosing between traditional and new criminal processes maps to 
the post-9/11 dichotomy of war versus crime as the model for addressing 
terrorism.24 The Bush administration has argued, not just that we face an 
emergency situation, but that we are in a war, from which it follows that we 
are entitled to – and perhaps even should – use different rules than we 
would in peacetime.  Others deny that we are at war, and they claim the 
traditional criminal process can handle terrorism.25 
In deciding between different forms of criminal process, and in 
particular between criminal trials and military tribunals, the baseline – as I 
already suggested – is critical.  Beliefs that military tribunals are as familiar 
and legitimate as criminal trials or that terrorism investigations and trials 
raise unique issues could lead a fair-minded observer to conclude that the 
new process provides the best option.  Similiarly, a belief that counter-
terrorism efforts amount to a war could lead one to accept detention without 
 
24 For discussions of this dichotomy, see Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution,
113 YALE L.J. ____, 1032-37 (2004), and PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM,
AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR 20-22 (2003).  For a very useful collection of 
essays that explore the constitutional consequences of war, including the balance between 
liberty and security, see THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND 
COMPLACENCY (Mark Tushnet ed. 2004).  One of the essays suggests the development of 
new criminal processes is a common and not surprising response to insurgency and 
terrorism.  See Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism 
and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During 
Wartime, in id. at 161.  Whether the new processes in other countries share the 
characteristics and implications that I suggest have emerged in the U.S. is a question 
beyond the scope of this essay. 
25 Some commentators have suggested international courts could play a variety of 
important roles.  See, for example, Laura Dickinson’s persuasive article, Using Legal 
Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, International Tribunals, 
and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407 (2002).  Yet the possibility of the U.S. 
choosing international tribunals is unlikely enough – in part because of death penalty issues 
– that I will assume the only options are domestic courts or military tribunals.  The U.S. 
likely would turn to such a tribunal – assuming one were available (the International 
Criminal Court does not have jurisdiction over terrorism per se, see Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, arts. 5-8) – only if another country refused to extradite a 
terrorist suspect to the U.S. and instead insisted on international process.  
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art33
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trial of suspects (for war purposes, relabeled “detainees” or “enemy 
combatants”) for the duration of the conflict.26 By contrast, beliefs that 
prosecutions for criminal activity should take place in ordinary criminal 
courts and that terrorism is often just an aggravated form of criminal 
activity will likely lead to the conclusion that we should lean heavily on 
traditional process and avoid military detention and military commissions.   
Another baseline is also important.  Consider the claims that 
everything changed after 9/11 and we now live in exceptional times.  An 
easy response to this assertion is simply to deny it.  Of course, this response 
admits, some things have changed since 9/11.  The shock of the attacks 
forced the problem of terrorism into the center of the national agenda and 
ensured that changes would be made in our strategies for fighting it.  But, as 
Bruce Ackerman argues, although al Qaeda’s terrorist campaign is 
destabilizing as well as deadly, it does not threaten the existence of the 
United States or the functioning of our constitutional system.27 Much 
remains the same, and daily life for the vast majority of us goes on as 
before.  Although we may think we are in danger, that perception derives 
from the ratings-driven media drumbeat of panic and not from anything 
tangible.  At most, life has changed for those who have friends or family 
members in the armed forces.28 If all of this is true, then the various actions 
I listed at the beginning of this essay are a series of overreactions. 
Yet perceptions matter.  Our lives have surely changed if we are 
more afraid, even if many of our daily routines have stayed the same.  After 
9/11, many Americans felt both less free and less secure.  The belief that 
our geographic isolation made us invulnerable to attack was broken.  The 
aspect of our nationalism that posits the U.S. as a progressive force in the 
world was shaken by the concretization of what for many of us had been at 
most a hazy abstraction – that the U.S. is hated by many people in many 
parts of the world.  (Although both beliefs were in some sense also 
reinforced by the attacks to the extent they are seen as an aberration and as 
 
26 On the significance of using the word “detainee” instead of “prisoner”  in terms of what 
it conveys about the legal rights, or lack thereof, of the person in custody, see JUDITH 
BUTLER, PRECARIOUS LIFE 64 (2004). 
27 Ackerman, supra note __, at 1040. 
28 Of course, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are part of what has changed since 9/11, so 
that this response perhaps can be faulted for not counting those whose lives have been 
changed by those wars.  But that riposte requires an explanation of how the invasion of 
Iraq, at least, supports the fight against terrorism – an explanation that can certainly be 
made, but not, I suspect, with arguments that many supporters of the war would publicly 
embrace.  (In any event, both sides in this debate would have to admit that a connection 
with terrorism existed once the U.S. began the war, because the war itself became an 
additional grievance against the U.S. among certain populations.) 
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an effort to stop progress.)  Many of us, as a result, were and remain quite 
willing to give up civil liberties if that somewhat vague sacrifice would 
restore security and everyday freedom.  Similarly, we support military 
action if it will prevent those who hate us from attacking us. 
I do not seek to resolve this specific debate.  Nor, for that matter, do 
I seek to define a proper balance between liberty and security in response to 
terror.  My goal, rather, is to describe and analyze the new criminal process 
in relation to traditional processes.  What is important, therefore, in my 
schematic account of the debate over post-9/11 change is the identification 
of diverging lines of thought that support, respectively, the traditional and 
new criminal processes.  Both are defensible; neither can be entirely proven 
or falsified absent some contestable value judgment or baseline. 
III. CRIMINAL PROCESSES, OLD AND NEW 
A. The Case for Tradition 
Under the traditional view, investigation with the goal of proving 
criminal charges in an ordinary criminal court is presumptively the 
appropriate way to assess the responsibility of and assign punishment to 
people who have carried out, attempted to carry out, or conspired to carry 
out a terrorist attack in the United States.29 Before 9/11, the United States 
conducted several successful trials of accused terrorists, including the trial 
of the first World Trade Center bombers.  Suspected terrorists or persons 
with links to them continue to be prosecuted in U.S. courts, and the failure 
of some investigations and prosecutions (such as that of Brandon Mayfield 
in Oregon) can be seen as evidence that the traditional approach is an 
effective, time-tested way of making sure that innocents are not swept up in 
the anti-terror campaign (because errors are more easily detected). 
Supporters of traditional process can point to several desirable 
features.  First, the familiarity of criminal trials gives them an aura of 
legitimacy.  The constitutional and other procedural rules for the conduct of 
criminal trials are well-developed and easily applied, and the substantive 
rules of federal criminal law are grounded in a large body of statutes and 
caselaw.  The power of this advantage is qualified, however, in the context 
of terrorism, at least when coupled with military action, because the military 
justice system has expertise with applying the laws of war – expertise that 
will come into play in the context of military commissions as well – while 
 
29 For a good example of the claim that traditional criminal processes, slightly modified, 
are well-suited to dealing with terrorism, see HEYMAN, supra note __.  For good 
discussions of the reasons for and against using military tribunals or ordinary courts for the 
trial of terrorists, see Agora: Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 320 (2002), 
especially the contributions by Ruth Wedgwood and Harold Koh. 
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some of the federal criminal statutes dealing with terrorism have received 
little interpretation. 
Traditional processes accord familiar rights to the subjects of 
investigations.  Searches generally require reasonably precise warrants, and 
suspects or witnesses cannot be compelled to incriminate themselves.30 
Evidence obtained in violation of these rules will usually be excluded at 
trial.  Due process also protects against other “conscience shocking” 
conduct.31 By contrast, current rules for counter-terror activities and 
military commissions provide few of these protections. 
Once charged, a defendant has a broad right to counsel of his or her 
choosing,32 whereas defendants before military proceedings will be 
assigned a military lawyer.  This disparity is not as great as it might first 
appear, however, because the formal right to counsel of one’s choice in 
federal court is often limited by the inability of many defendants to pay for 
anything other than an often overburdened court-appointed lawyer.  For 
their part, military lawyers are ethically bound and fully able to represent 
their clients zealously, and defendants before a military tribunal have a 
qualified right to obtain civilian counsel – although the Defense Department 
has placed greater restrictions on counsel than exist for the ordinary military 
justice system or for terrorism trials in federal court.33 
In addition, the Federal Rules of Evidence draw upon long 
experience with problems of proof to provide a framework for advocacy 
that largely focuses on the most reliable evidence.  The Classified 
Information Procedures Act adds a method for addressing the government’s 
concerns about disclosing sensitive information.34 Defendants in a criminal 
trial may invoke the aid of the court to obtain documents or the testimony of 
witnesses, and prosecutors are required to disclose exculpatory evidence.35 
30 See U.S. CONST. amdts. IV & V; Missouri v. Siebert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004); Groh v. 
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004). 
31 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
32 See U.S. CONST. amdt. VI. 
33 Civilian counsel must be U.S. citizens, members of a domestic bar, and have a security 
clearance.  See 32 C.F.R. § 9.4(c).  Defense counsel are obligated to reveal confidences 
under certain circumstances that go beyond the traditional crime/fraud exception to the 
attorney-client privilege, and attorney-client communications are subject to monitoring “for 
security or intelligence purposes.”  Civilian counsel can be prevented from seeing all of the 
evidence at trial if security concerns justify restrictions on access.  32 C.F.R. pts. 13 & 14; 
Human Rights First, Trials Under Military Order: A Guide to the Final Rules for Military 
Commissions (Oct. 2004).  
34 18 U.S.C. App. 3. 
35 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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Military commissions are not obligated to provide the same assistance.  
Criminal proceedings in federal court are almost always open to the public, 
which allows the press to monitor them and report on unusual or dramatic 
events.  The decisionmakers at trial and on appeal are independent, 
acquittals are final, and the appellate process provides rigorous review.  By 
contrast, the members of military commissions and review panels are 
appointed officials within the command hierarchy of the U.S. military, and 
acquittals are apparently subject to review on the same terms as 
convictions.36 Defendants in federal court have a right to a speedy trial,37 
and acquittal usually means that they will be freed.  By contrast, the 
combination of detention and military commissions may translate into no 
trial or a trial after several years in custody, and acquittal may not lead to 
release if executive officials decide it is important to continue holding a 
person (and if habeas review is unavailable or limited on the merits).  
Importantly, traditional processes need not be static.  The federal 
courts draw on a common law tradition that takes as a fundamental premise 
the need for law to adapt to changing circumstances.  Consistent with 
evolving constitutional norms, law enforcement agencies and courts can 
experiment with procedural mechanisms, particularly if those experiments 
would maintain the primacy of core traditional processes (although the 
degree of permissible experimentation is a topic of fierce debate).   
These characteristics of the criminal process and trial resonate with 
history and with ideas of due process to form a system that is widely 
perceived as fair in the aggregate.  The perception of fairness also derives 
from the separation of powers.  Life-tenured judges and the requirement of 
jury trial are examples of separation of powers at work in the traditional 
criminal trial, and they provide a counterweight to executive power.38 
Significantly, this familiar model of separated power goes beyond control of 
power at the highest levels and beyond providing counterweights in the 
machinery of law-making, law enforcement, and legal interpretation.  
Separation of powers is also and at least as importantly about fragmenting 
the government’s ability to exercise power over individual lives and 
preventing total control over their bodies, minds, and circumstances.  
Robert Cover accurately observed that “Legal interpretation takes place in a 
field of pain and death,” but separation of powers may lower the body 
 
36 32 C.F.R. § 9.6(h)(3). 
37 See U.S. CONST., amdt. VI; 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq.
38 For elaboration of this claim with respect to juries, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 81-119 (1998). 
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count.39 
Military commissions or tribunals, by contrast, were not used for 
trying al Qaeda-style terrorists before 9/11, and the lack of precedents and 
processes that have evolved over time may hamper their effectiveness, at 
least in the initial stages.  Moreover, to the extent they remain extraordinary 
courts, infrequently used compared to the routine of the traditional process, 
the risk exists that they will be unable to develop into efficient, reliable, and 
just institutions. 
B. The Case for the New Criminal Process 
 Whatever the merits of the traditional investigative and trial 
processes, they have never been the only option.  The military justice 
system, for example, provides a separate investigatory and prosecutorial 
system.  So, too, a long history of creating and using special military 
tribunals supports their legitimacy in at least some circumstances.40 Finally, 
counter-terror activities – at least those with international overtones – have 
never been the sole province of traditional, domestic law enforcement and 
criminal courts. 
The primary advantage of the new criminal process is its flexibility 
and efficiency.  To the extent constitutional and statutory rules do not apply 
or apply more leniently, executive officials have more discretion to craft 
strategies that adapt to the specific needs of a particular investigation or 
other activity.  Suspects can be held, and officials can decide to interrogate, 
or not, to bring charges, or not, bound by only mild time constraints.  
Similarly, the precise characteristics of military commissions are a moving 
target, because the executive branch can modify their procedures to take 
account of particular circumstances.  Although Congress has authorized 
military tribunals in the past, it has not overseen them to the same extent 
that it has overseen the workings of the federal courts.  For example, 
military commissions apparently need not comply with the provisions of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, and perhaps not even with the Geneva 
Conventions.41 The result is a degree of flexibility not enjoyed by police, 
regular prosecutors, or federal courts. 
 
39 Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986), reprinted in 
NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 203 (Martha 
Minow et al. eds. 1995). 
40 Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions,
5 GREEN BAG 2ND ___, 250-52 (2002). 
41 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38-43 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  For a contrary view with 
respect to the applicability of the laws of war, see Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, 
International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 2653, 2661-61 (2005). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Terrorism and the New Criminal Process 14
Another advantage of military commissions from the executive 
branch’s perspective is greater control over public access, so that defendants 
have less opportunity to use the trial as a public forum and classified 
evidence may be presented more easily.42 Further, because the Federal 
Rules of Evidence need not apply to military tribunals, relaxed standards of 
relevance and admissibility are available.  To some observers, relaxation of 
traditional rules is a common-sense step toward realistic standards of 
evidence, while others would highlight the risks of using prejudicial, 
inaccurate, or misleading evidence – particularly when the information was 
obtained by coercion and presented at secret proceedings. 
Military commissions do away with the need for a randomly 
selected jury which must be protected from threats or retaliation – a 
particularly serious issue in the terrorism context – even as it must be 
educated about the issues in the trial.  The decisionmakers on a military 
commission will usually be officers in the armed forces and thus may be 
more capable and better prepared for trial than the average juror, but their 
independence will be suspect because they will have been selected by and 
will be a part of the executive branch.  Time-consuming court appeals can 
be avoided by providing for administrative or executive review, with the 
possibility of habeas proceedings, if necessary.  The existence of some 
review provides a check against unfair proceedings and inaccurate results, 
although the lack of significant independent review creates the possibility 
that errors will go undetected or uncorrected.  
Military tribunals also have another advantage: they are not bound 
by the federal criminal code.  The subject matter jurisdiction of the current 
military commissions, for example, extends to “violations of the laws of 
war” and related offenses.43 The Department of Defense has prepared 
regulations that codify several crimes purportedly drawn from the law of 
war or armed conflict.  The definitions of the various offenses are careful 
and reasonable, but they depart from ordinary federal criminal law.  For 
example, the definition of conspiracy incorporates an idea of “common 
criminal purpose” that may go beyond federal conspiracy law.  When 
combined with relatively generous notions of command responsibility, 
definitions like this give the government broader and higher reach within 
terrorist groups by increasing the chances of convicting higher level 
 
42 For example, the current military commission regulations provide for secrecy.  32 C.F.R. 
§ 9.6(b)(3). 
43 Id., §§ 9.3(b), 11.3(a). 
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members and members who were not involved in a particular attack.44 The 
risk, of course, is that broad definitions of crime will shade into guilt by 
association. 
Somewhat more abstractly, the new criminal process allows greater 
control over the present circumstances and ultimate fate of the defendant.  
Detention, coercive interrogation, and military trial form an overall 
approach that treats the suspected terrorist as a person over whose body and 
circumstances the government should exercise total and exclusive control.  
To many, this will seem a patently illegitimate goal, but if the magnitude of 
the threat of terrorism is great, one could argue that such an approach is 
justified, although perhaps only as a temporary measure. 
Finally, the new criminal process serves a domestic political 
function.  Terrorism can cause panic and uncertainty that have wide 
impacts, and elected leaders may respond by seeking to project an image of 
resoluteness and reassurance.  Forceful, sweeping action – that is, a new 
level of state violence that is central to the new criminal process – is one 
way to achieve this goal.  Arguably, this approach is consistent with the 
separation of powers because it falls within executive authority to defend 
the nation against attack.  The risks of this approach are something I will 
discuss in the last section of this essay. 
IV. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE NEW CRIMINAL PROCESS 
One might think the Constitution stands in the way of the new 
criminal process, but for several reasons that expectation would be 
inaccurate.  First, some of the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act expand 
law enforcement authority to gain information that is not protected by 
constitutional privacy protections.45 Similarly, enforcing existing 
immigration laws may generate harsh results but this enforcement is hardly 
unconstitutional.  Second, much of the new criminal process is implemented 
overseas, and the Supreme Court generally has found that the Constitution 
 
44 Id., §§ 11.6(c)(3), 11.6(c)(6); Jenny S. Martinez & Allison Danner, Guilty Associations: 
Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International 
Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. ___ (2005). 
45 In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), for example, the Supreme Court ruled that 
pen registers and trap and trace devices for telephone lines are permissible because people 
do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone numbers they dial.  Some of 
the Act’s provisions relating to the internet may go too far in revealing substantive 
information, but courts are unlikely to strike those provisions down in their entirety even if 
some portions are invalid.  Finally, it is probable that most, if not all, of the expanded third-
party subpoena power provided by the Act will survive constitutional review.  
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places few limits on the activities of government officials outside the U.S.46 
The Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination and due process clauses might 
limit the admissibility of coerced testimony in subsequent federal court 
proceedings, but that limit matters little if the goal is to gain information 
rather than a conviction, or if the trial will take place in an overseas military 
tribunal. 
Third, even when they apply, most constitutional doctrines are not 
absolute.  Instead, doctrine is replete with tests – exigent circumstances, 
reasonableness, assessments of the weight of government interests – that are 
intentionally flexible and often favor law enforcement.  That is certainly 
true in the context of coercive interrogation.47 Finally, consider the nature 
of constitutional rights themselves.  Far from existing on their own 
foundation, rights are dependent upon and exist only in relation to state 
power.  So, for example, the expansion of civil rights and liberties in the 
second half of the twentieth century must be placed in the context of an 
increase in state power that is at least as significant, especially in terms of 
the government’s power to influence, intervene in, and even control our 
daily lives (for better or worse).  Reliance on civil liberties arguments to 
counter the new criminal process may result in expansion or entrenchment 
of certain rights, but only against a background of increased state power.48 
Congress could pass statutes that limit the new criminal process, but 
as we have seen Congress is more likely to stand aside or pass statutes that 
codify and expand the new process (perhaps with sunset provisions).  Even 
in the midst of the Abu Ghraib controversy, Congress failed to reinforce or 
expand explicit limits on the use of coercive interrogation techniques.  Over 
time, Congress may take a second look, but experience suggests that, at 
most, it will tinker around the edges and will not do away with the new 
criminal process.49 Moreover, statutes that impose criminal penalties for 
 
46 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding Fourth 
Amendment provisions on searches and seizures have little extraterritorial application); 
Mark A. Godsey, The New Frontier of Constitutional Confession Law – The International 
Arena, 91 GEO. L.J. 851 (2003). 
47 See Parry, Just for Fun, supra note __, at ___-___; John T. Parry, Constitutional 
Interpretation, Coercive Interrogation, and Civil Rights Litigation After Chavez v. 
Martinez, 39 GA. L. REV. 733, 763-81, 819-29 (2005). 
48 For a discussion of constitutional balancing tests and the dependence of rights on state 
power, see Parry, Just for Fun, supra note __, at  ___-__. 
49 So far, Congress’s only legislative response to the revelations of torture and abuse at Abu 
Ghraib and other places has been to insert a provision into the Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief that 
prohibits the use of any funds appropriated in that act “to subject any person in the custody 
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abusive investigatory activity will not be applied unless the executive 
branch chooses to prosecute – and the exercise of discretion not to 
prosecute is the more likely result in all but a few cases.  Finally, 
international law imposes obligations on the conduct of U.S. officials 
overseas, but few if any of those prohibitions are enforceable in U.S. courts 
and thus provide little immediate constraint.50 
With respect to detentions, the executive branch has considerable 
power.  A plurality of the Supreme Court declared in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
that “indefinite detention [of citizen enemy combatants] for the purpose of 
interrogation” is not authorized by any relevant federal statute, and it also 
seemed to say there is no inherent executive emergency power to take such 
action.51 But the plurality found that the AUMF provided authority to 
detain enemy combatants, including citizens, for the duration of the conflict 
(at least as long as “United States troops are still involved in active combat 
in Afghanistan”), so long as detained individuals received some form of 
process.52 Also, the plurality said nothing about inherent power to detain 
for a limited period or about the conduct of interrogation during a limited 
detention, except to imply that such interrogation may be limited to 
“appropriate” actions by relevant legislation, as with the detention at issue 
in Hamdi, and therefore possibly limited by various sources of domestic and 
international law that the U.S. recognizes. 
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, was willing in principle 
to recognize “an emergency power of necessity . . . limited by the 
emergency” that would justify unauthorized executive detention and, 
presumably, interrogation of a citizen who is “an imminent threat to the 
safety of the nation and its people.”53 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice 
Stevens, rejected an inherent emergency power to detain a citizen 
indefinitely, but his statement that his views “apply only to citizens” leaves 
open the possibility that he would approve detention and, perhaps, coercive 
interrogation of an alien (and perhaps even of a citizen for a limited 
period).54 For his part, Justice Thomas was willing to recognize a broad 
emergency power.55 In short, even the most rights-protective reading of 
 
or under the physical control of the United States to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment of punishment.”  Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 1031(a)(1) (May 11, 2005).  
50 See infra note __. 
51 124 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 (2204) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
52 Id. at 2642. 
53 Id. at 2659 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
54 Id. at 2673 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
55 Id. at 2674-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Hamdi will leave considerable room for executive action.   
The Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in Padilla v. Hanft confirms 
this view of Hamdi by holding that the AUMF allows detention without 
prosecution for the duration of hostilities of a citizen enemy combatant, 
regardless of where he or she is captured.  The Fourth Circuit stressed that 
detention is a legitimate goal in and of itself and that it serves other goals 
that the court also considered to be legitimate: 
[T]he availability of criminal process cannot be 
determinative of the power to detain, if for no other reason 
that that criminal prosecution may well not achieve the very 
purpose for which detention is authorized in the first place – 
the prevention of return to the field of battle.  Equally 
important, in many instances criminal prosecution would 
impede the Executive in its attempts to gather intelligence 
from the detainees and to restrict the detainee’s 
communication with confederates so as to ensure that the 
detainee does not pose a continuing threat to national security 
even as he is confined . . . .56 
Here, the Fourth Circuit has expanded on the Hamdi Court’s interpretation 
of “appropriate force” in the AUMF to approve detention without trial for 
purposes – isolating, controlling, and thoroughly, perhaps coercively, 
interrogating a prisoner – that go beyond the core law of war concern about 
preventing enemy soldiers from returning to combat.57 For what it is worth, 
however, Padilla, who is being held in the United States, has been able to 
contest the legal basis for his detention in habeas proceedings and will still 
be able to contest the factual basis for it, although his chances of success 
appear dim.58 
Importantly, moreover, Hamdi’s companion case Rasul v. Bush –
which held that federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
habeas corpus claims by aliens in U.S. custody at Guantanamo Bay (and 
perhaps elsewhere) – strongly suggests that the executive branch will have 
to provide some justification for prolonged detention of anyone, not just a 
citizen held in the U.S.59 Taken together, Hamdi and Rasul suggest a 
 
56 Padilla v. Hanft, No. 05-6396 (4th Cir., Sept. 9, 2005) (slip op. at 19). 
57 For discussion of Hamdi and the scope of detention under the laws of war, see Curtis A. 
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005); Goodman & Jinks, supra note __, at 2658-62, and Ingrid 
Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and the Charming 
Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293 (2005). 
58 See Padilla, slip op. at 7 n.1. 
59 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004); see also supra note 11. 
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moderate receptiveness to claims of a limited and justified emergency 
power to detain and interrogate but also signal a familiar and clear 
preference for congressional authorization and participation.  As I have 
argued elsewhere, the opinions also suggest troubled openness to coercive 
interrogation under limited conditions.60 The Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
Padilla at the very least reinforces these conclusions. 
After Hamdi and Rasul, the executive branch set up Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals to consider the status of detainees at Guantanamo, 
and nearly all of the detentions have been upheld.  District courts have split 
on the sufficiency of this process, and appeals are pending.61 These 
detainees may gain some procedural protections, but their hearings will 
never approach the kinds of due process standards that are commonplace in 
domestic civil, let alone criminal, litigation.  
With respect to military commissions, the fact that the United States 
has used military tribunals with some frequency in the past gives weight to 
the argument that the President has inherent authority to create and use 
them for terrorists pursuant to the commander-in-chief power.   But the 
history requires some parsing.  Past practice and precedent provide strong 
authority for using military tribunals in occupied territory when civilian 
justice is unavailable.62 But this aspect of the history says little about trying 
terrorists for activities in or directed against the territory of the United 
States when ordinary courts are available. 
Military tribunals created for domestic use during the Revolutionary 
War predate the Constitution and so provide only an uncertain precedent.  
The use of military tribunals during the War of 1812 presents a closer 
parallel to the present day, although arguably the threat to national survival 
was much greater and so might justify actions that would remain unjustified 
under current conditions.  The use of military commissions during the Civil 
War – another instance in which national survival was at stake – produced 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Milligan, which created a 
presumption in favor of criminal trials for citizens not engaged in hostilities, 
 
60 John T. Parry, Progress and Justification in American Criminal Law, 40 TULSA L. REV.
___, ___ n. __ (2005). 
61 See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp.2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding the 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals fail to provide due process); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. 
Supp.2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding no substantive legal basis to review complaint about 
detention). 
62 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note __, at 252; Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, 
Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. ___, 1292-95 
(2002). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Terrorism and the New Criminal Process 20
at least when ordinary courts remained open.63 
The critical precedent is World War II, because it produced the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Quirin, which approved use of a 
military tribunal for eight saboteurs, one of whom was a citizen.64 The 
decision rested primarily on the fact that war had been declared and 
Congress had provided express statutory authority for military tribunals. 
The Court interpreted the statutory language as itself a conferral of 
jurisdiction on military tribunals, but the persuasiveness and sufficiency of 
that interpretation has been the subject of serious criticism and remains a 
matter of sharp debate.  The Court distinguished Milligan, for example, as a 
case about a person who was a “non-belligerent, not subject to the law of 
war.”65 
The formal declaration of war is lacking today, but federal law 
continues to recognize the possibility of military tribunals, Congress passed 
a resolution, the AUMF, that indicates a general desire to give broad power 
to the president to combat terrorism, and the Bush administration claimed 
legislative authorization as one of the bases for creation of tribunals.  In 
Hamdi, a plurality of the Supreme Court endorsed Quirin and suggested 
that “an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal 
could provide sufficient due process to justify detention of an enemy 
combatant.”66 Although the plurality did not say that the specific military 
commissions established by the Bush administration are “appropriately 
authorized and properly constituted,” its willingness to adopt a broad 
 
63 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Katyal & Tribe, supra note __, at 1272. 
64 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).   
65 Id. at ___.  For analysis of Quirin, compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note __, at 252-
53 with Dickinson, supra note __, at 1420, and Katyal & Tribe, supra note __, at 1280-91.  
Only one of the statutes relied on in Quirin remains applicable today.  See 10 U.S.C. § 821 
(“The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon court-martial do not deprive 
military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction 
with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war nay be tried by 
military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.”).  For my part, I think 
critics such as Katyal & Tribe make too much of the need for a declared war, based on a 
claims that otherwise Constitutional process and structure have been displaced.  Instead, 
the critical issue is whether the substance of congressional participation has been followed 
where participation is possible (as opposed, say, to the executive’s initial response to an 
attack or invasion).  For a similar conclusion, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 37-38 
(D.C. Cir. 2005).  I also disagree with the apparent implication from the Katyal & Tribe 
argument that declarations of war allow – and are the only means of allowing – suspension 
or curtailment of civil liberties.  Even if that once was true, our constitutional landscape has 
changed so much in the past 50 years that ample room exists to dispute – in both directions 
– a necessary equation between declared war and broad, unreviewable emergency power. 
66 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640-41, 2651 (plurality opinion). 
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reading of the AUMF strongly hints at such a conclusion.67 That conclusion 
becomes all the more certain when one takes Justice Thomas’s more 
permissive approach to executive power into account.68 Thus, the D.C. 
Circuit’s recent decision finding congressional authorization for the Bush 
administration’s military commissions under the AUMF and 18 U.S.C. § 
821 is hardly surprising.69 
Left unclear in the case law are the conditions under which the 
President has an inherent power to convene military tribunals.  As I noted 
above, this power exists most easily for territory under military occupation 
during hostilities.  Beyond that, I would suggest that any inherent power to 
convene military tribunals is not an ordinary aspect of the commander-in-
chief power and thus is not a standing alternative to criminal courts.  
Instead, it is an emergency power that applies only in unusual 
circumstances.  Although I would not press this position, one could 
reasonably argue that President Bush’s order creating military tribunals was 
justified on emergency grounds alone, without reference to any act of 
Congress, at the time it was issued.  Even if that were once true, however, 
the question then would be whether sufficient time has passed to put the 
continuing validity of that argument in doubt, absent congressional action.  
In my view, any emergency has passed by now, so that any currently 
existing tribunals or commissions can only be justified by an act of 
Congress.  The D.C. Circuit’s Hamdan opinion, of course, found sufficient 
congressional action and thus, like Hamdi, was able to sidestep the inherent 
authority debate.70 
In light of the apparent willingness of the federal courts to find 
congressional authorization for tribunals, the issue reduces to whether there 
are any constraints on the ability of Congress and the President, acting 
together, to take what could be terrorism prosecutions within the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts and put them before military 
tribunals.  (I leave aside cases that would be more easily part of the 
traditional jurisdiction of military commissions and would be less likely 
ever to land in federal court.)  Here, we are squarely in Justice Jackson’s 
first category of separation of powers analysis, in which executive action 
pursuant to congressional authorization will be upheld unless the federal 
 
67 Id. at 2640-42. 
68 See id. at 2674-85 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
69 See Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 37-38. 
70 See id. 
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government as a whole does not have the power to act.71 The following 
analysis suggests, I think, the most that reasonably could be expected from 
the Supreme Court in favor of federal courts under this framework (as 
opposed, for example, to what an advocate might seek to establish). 
Separation of powers doctrine clearly insulates certain executive 
actions from complete judicial review in the areas of foreign affairs and 
military action.  But separation of powers also protects the federal courts 
against interference and actions that undermine their role in the federal 
system.  Prevailing doctrine seems to hold that certain kinds of cases cannot 
be diverted from federal courts into administrative tribunals, especially not 
without some ultimate federal court review of the proceeding.72 The Court 
has established a flexible test for resolving these issues: 
Among the factors upon which we have focused are the extent 
to which “the essential attributes of judicial power” are 
reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to 
which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of 
jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III 
courts, the origins and importance of the right to be 
adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart 
from the requirements of Article III.73 
Although multi-factor inquiries like this are famously malleable, the test 
suggests that an expansive system of unreviewable trials before military 
commissions would be unconstitutional.  At the same time, however, not 
every case that could be brought in federal court must be brought there.  In 
particular, I am not aware of any requirement that the federal government 
must use federal courts instead of tribunals for individuals who acted and 
are apprehended overseas, at least in times of war or emergency.  And 
Quirin suggests that even less may be required, at least in times of war or 
emergency.74 The meaning of “war or emergency” here is plainly both 
 
71 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, ___ (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
72 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article 
III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988). 
73 CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1985). 
74 A plurality of the Court suggested a more formal test in Northern Pipeline v. Marathon 
Oil and also recognized courts-martial as one of the situations in which Congress could 
take cases away from Article III courts.  458 U.S. 50, 64-70 (1982).  Although the court-
martial exception aids proponents of military commissions at some general level, the 
questions would remain whether this exception actually includes military commissions of 
the kind authorized by the Bush administration and whether terrorism trials for acts in or 
aimed at the U.S. by people who possibly could not be subjected to courts martial can be 
heard before military commissions instead of in federal courts.  Worth noting as well is that 
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critical and fuzzy, as I discuss in the last section.  
 At a minimum, habeas corpus review in federal court should be 
available, as it was in Quirin and as the Bush administration has admitted it 
would be for some cases before military tribunals.  Unless the scope of 
review is extremely limited, habeas arguably preserves the “essential 
attributes” of judicial power and limits the jurisdiction and powers of 
military tribunals.  But the meaningful availability of habeas for 
extraterritorial cases is uncertain at best; it depends not only on a strong 
reading of Rasul to establish jurisdiction but also on finding a meaningful 
substantive claim under federal law.75 For criminal cases against people 
acting or found in the U.S. and when significant punishment is at stake, the 
Court’s test can easily be read to require an actual criminal trial in an 
Article III court – but such a result requires reading Milligan strongly and 
reading Quirin as an outlier.76 In Padilla, by contrast, the Fourth Circuit 
followed the lead of the Hamdi plurality to read Milligan more narrowly 
and Quirin more broadly.77 For most cases, in short, and not just for cases 
with no “U.S. nexus,” habeas may be the most that is possible, and even 
habeas may be unavailable or substantively inadequate.   
Under any of these readings, we see the new criminal process at 
work in a particularly interesting way.  Habeas corpus – the traditional 
 
the Supreme Court approved the transfer of civil suits from federal courts to an 
international arbitration tribunal in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).  The 
long history of and congressional acquiescence in allowing the executive branch to settle 
international claims supported the holding.  In the context of military tribunals, where 
individual life and liberty are at stake and the history is more ambiguous, Dames & 
Moore’s application is more tenuous.  Compare infra n. __ (discussing the relevance of 
international extradition litigation). 
75 See supra notes 11 & 60.  Courts will likely reject claims arising under treaties such as 
the Geneva Conventions on the ground that the treaties are not self-executing in the sense 
that they do not create rights that individuals can enforce judicially.  See Hamdan, 415 F.3d 
at 38-40.  For discussion of the issues raised by the effort to enforce international human 
rights and humanitarian norms in U.S. courts, see David Sloss, The Domestication of 
International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties,
24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129 (1999); Stephen I. Vladeck, Casenote, Non-Self-Executing 
Treaties and the Suspension Clause After St. Cyr, 113 YALE L.J. 2007 (2004); Carlos M. 
Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695 (1995).  
See also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2734, 2763, 2767 (2004) (appearing to hold 
that non-self-execution declarations prevent federal courts from “interpreting and applying 
international human rights law” and prevent a treaty from creating “obligations enforceable 
in the federal courts”). 
76 Compare Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2660-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (insisting that Hamdi must 
be charged with a crime or released). 
77 Padilla v. Hanft, No. 05-6396 (4th Cir., Sept. 9, 2005) (slip. op. at 23-24). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Terrorism and the New Criminal Process 24
guarantee of constitutional rights against arbitrary state action – becomes a 
way of legitimizing departures from tradition.  Put more concretely, habeas 
functions in the “war on terror” cases as a backstop that likely holds out 
only the possibility of minimal due process protections, while most of the 
real criminal process – whether for detention or trial – takes place in non-
Article III forums.  In some cases, moreover, habeas is a mirage.  Either it is 
jurisdictionally available but substantively empty, or, depending upon how 
Rasul is interpreted, jurisdiction will be entirely lacking (these cases will be 
labeled exceptions, of course).78 
Still, if the federal government does divert cases to military 
commissions that otherwise would come before federal criminal courts, 
some possibility remains that federal courts would use habeas to impose 
many of the constitutional criminal procedure requirements developed in 
recent decades, on the ground that trials before commissions are the 
functional equivalent of a criminal trial in state or federal court.79 
Policymakers considering the actual use – and not just the formal creation – 
of military commissions might conclude that the resulting process would be 
 
78 International extradition may provide a fruitful analogy here.  The consequences of an 
extradition are serious – a person, perhaps a citizen, will be seized, removed from this 
country, and sent overseas to face a criminal process that may be far less rights-protective 
than our own.  The extraditee receives a hearing before a federal judge or magistrate, but 
the process resembles a probable cause hearing, and denials of extradition are rare.  What is 
more, several courts have ruled that the federal judge or magistrate who presides over an 
extradition hearing acts under Article I, not Article III.  See Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 
1322, 1327 (9th Cir. 1997); LoDuca v. United States, 93 F.3d 1100, 1005-09 (2nd Cir. 
1996).  The extraditee may seek habeas relief, but “habeas corpus is available only to 
inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the 
treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the 
finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.”  Fernandez v. 
Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925) (Holmes. J.).  For discussion of the extradition process, 
including Article III issues and the scope of habeas, see John T. Parry, The Lost History of 
International Extradition Litigation, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 93 (2002).  In short, the extradition 
process, which dates back to the 1840s, could be a model for the new criminal process, for 
it incorporates significant amounts of executive discretion, minimal legal process, and 
easily-satisfied substantive rules.  Because extradition touches on international relations, 
courts have also been extremely deferential to the executive branch, despite the individual 
liberty issues involved, going so far as to say that, if there were no extradition statute, “the 
Executive would have plenary authority to extradite.”  LoDuca, 93 F.3d at 1003.  Such 
words are music to the ears of proponents of indefinite detention, military commissions, 
and extraordinary rendition.  For a detailed explanation of why those words are nonetheless 
flatly wrong from the perspectives of history and precedent, see Parry, Lost History, supra,
at 105-24. 
79 Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSN. L. ___, 290-91 (2004); 
Katyal & Tribe, supra note __, at 1303-04. 
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too cumbersome to provide significant advantages over criminal trials in 
ordinary courts, at least for cases in which detainees would have meaningful 
access to meaningful habeas review. 
V. THE NEW CRIMINAL PROCESS, EMERGENCY POWER,
AND THE STATE OF EXCEPTION 
So far, I have tried to present the arguments for and against the new 
criminal process and to show how, desirable or not, it is roughly consistent 
with existing constitutional norms.  I have also indulged the assumption that 
the traditional criminal process is presumptively superior to the new 
criminal process for addressing issues relating to terrorism, despite the new 
criminal process’s greater flexibility.  That assumption is open to several 
objections.  First, of course, is one that I mentioned near the beginning of 
this essay: even if there should be a presumption in favor of traditional 
criminal processes in normal times, the “war on terror” puts us in a situation 
in which the presumption has shifted.  Hard-headed analysis, in short, 
arguably suggests that we are in the exceptional situation in which the war 
approach trumps the crime approach, with the result that the new criminal 
process has also become the new presumption.  Some things, in other 
words, have changed after all, at least for a while. 
Second, one could take a further step to argue that there is simply no 
basis for a presumption in favor of the traditional criminal process.  
Terrorism is not just a problem of law enforcement; it also implicates 
national security, diplomacy, economic policy, immigration, the role of the 
military, and many other issues.  Seen in this way, reasonable people can 
easily assert that, at best, traditional criminal processes should be merely 
one option along with other, more violent but perhaps also more effective 
responses.  This objection, then, goes beyond the war/crime dichotomy to 
suggest that terrorism is a complex issue that requires a nuanced and 
flexible response along a variety of policy and legal paths.  As with many 
other issues, a narrow focus on one form of legal process is short-sighted 
and ultimately ineffective.   
I do not wish to dispute this point at a general level, except to 
suggest that it obviously also applies to the problem of “ordinary” crime, 
and, indeed, to nearly any issue of public importance, as much as to the 
problem of terrorism.  Faced with this insight, moreover, one can 
straightforwardly respond that we still have to decide what processes to use 
under what circumstances.  That is, traditional criminal processes remain an 
available choice, and we need some way of deciding when to use traditional 
processes and when to use the new criminal process.  Also, to the extent 
issues once seen as the province primarily of legal process and ordinary 
policing are now seen as larger issues of social concern along a variety of 
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metrics, this shift simply reflects the fact of increasing rationalization and 
expansion of modern state power.  The interesting question, especially for 
purposes of this essay, is the role that emergencies play in this process. 
Third, and most important, one could dispute my claim that the 
traditional process exists at all.  Put differently, there may once have been 
something close to what I have described as the traditional criminal process, 
but we long ago began to abandon that approach, and the new criminal 
process is simply the criminal process that we have.   Less dramatically, one 
might argue that the new criminal process is a permanent part of our 
everyday criminal process, alongside and partially overriding the remnants 
of the traditional process.  To the extent this third objection has weight, it 
raises important issues about the persistence of emergency powers, as well 
as about the difference between exceptional and ordinary conditions, and 
between emergency and normal powers. 
At the beginning of this essay, I argued that the President and 
Congress have created a legal structure for a state of emergency.  Since 
9/11, constitutional law scholars have renewed the debate over the existence 
and constitutionality of emergency powers.  Unlike the constitutions of 
many other countries, the U.S. Constitution has little to say on this issue 
apart from preventing quartering of soldiers in people’s homes and allowing 
Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus “in Cases of Rebellion or 
Invasion [where] the public Safety may require it.”80 To some scholars, this 
means there are no other emergency powers – anything the government 
does must accord with the Constitution in normal or emergency times.  
Others suggest the Constitution must include a broad inherent authority to 
act in cases of emergency (and this power is often claimed for the executive 
branch).81 A third position, articulated most persuasively in articles by 
 
80 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl.2 & amend. III.  For discussion of emergency provisions in 
other constitutions, see Gabriel L. Negretto and José Antonio Aguilar Rivera, Liberalism 
and Emergency Powers in Latin America: Reflections on Carl Schmitt and the Theory of 
Constitutional Dictatorship, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1797 (2000); Kim Lane Scheppele, Law 
in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1001 (2004).  The Supreme Court has not clearly ruled on whether the President 
can suspend the writ unilaterally in an emergency, but most commentators take Chief 
Justice Taney’s opinion in Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 
9487), claiming the President lacks such power, to state the correct and proper 
interpretation of the suspension clause.  Notably, however, the Lincoln administration did 
not obey the court order for the release of Merryman. 
81 Compare Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick O. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution,
113 YALE L. J. 1801 (2004), with Ackerman, supra note __, and with Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257 (2004).  The Office 
of Legal Counsel and the Defense Department’s Working Group on Detainee 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art33
Terrorism and the New Criminal Process 27
Jules Lobel and Oren Gross, maintains there is no inherent constitutional 
emergency power, but the President may violate the Constitution in an 
emergency and then face whatever consequences Congress and the people 
wish to impose.  Institutional and political controls, in short, might be able 
to limit and contain emergency power even if law cannot.82 
I have little to add to this specific debate, except to say that I find 
the arguments made by Professors Lobel and Gross to be convincing.  As 
both admit, however, their model is not the dominant approach.  Far more 
likely is the prospect of courts accepting claims of expanded power in times 
of emergency, combined with efforts to mitigate those powers once the 
emergency has passed, which creates a “two steps forward, one step back” 
process of increasing state – and particularly executive – power.  In light of 
their root in various emergency situations, moreover, these increased 
powers tend to take a special form in which more familiar legal processes 
are pushed aside in favor of efficient discretionary authority. 
Writing after 9/11 and drawing primarily on the work of Carl 
Schmitt, Giorgio Agamben (among others) has argued that in modern states 
“the state of exception tends increasingly to appear as the dominant 
paradigm of government.”83 In a state of exception, normal rules are 
suspended, and sovereign authority wields discretionary power.  When the 
suspension of normal rules becomes the new norm, then no space remains 
for anything but discretion; ordinary legal rules are pushed aside.  If, 
therefore, as Schmitt claimed, “the state remains, whereas law recedes” in a 
time of exception, then, as Mark Tushnet suggests, a permanent condition 
of emergency threatens “the end of the rule of law itself.”84 
My point is not that we live now in a permanent, across-the-board 
state of exception in which the rule of law is at best window-dressing.  
Exceptions and emergencies appear to work differently in modern, liberal 
democracies.  We don’t clamor openly for the firm hand of a leader who 
will represent us better than a corrupt or indecisive legislature (although 
many of us value “leadership” and “decisiveness” to the point almost of 
 
Interrogations both articulated strong views of inherent executive power in their analysis of 
the law of interrogation.   
82 See Lobel, supra note __; Gross, Chaos and Rules, supra note __.   
83 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 2 (Kevin Attell trans. 2005). 
84 CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 12 (George Schwab trans. 1985); Mark Tushnet, Emergencies and the Idea 
of Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME, supra note __, at 45.  See also 
BUTLER, supra note __, at 50-100; Oren Gross, The Normless and Exceptionless 
Exception: Carl Schmitt’s Theory of Emergency Powers and the ‘Norm-Exception’ 
Dichotomy, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. ___, 1854, 1857 (2000); Lobel, supra note __, at 1404. 
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fetish).  We are often willing to see firmness applied to domestic or foreign 
“others” who are implicated in the emergency and do not deserve the 
benefit of legal “technicalities,” but we take a different approach to matters 
closer to “home.”  As policy issues arise one by one in a variety of areas, 
rational, well-intentioned policymakers often conclude that increased 
government discretion is necessary, sometimes girded by procedural 
frameworks.  Issues of foreign policy and national security are particularly 
susceptible to this kind of treatment, but they are not the only areas, and the 
definition of what makes a national security issue seems continually to 
expand (to include, for example, parts of the criminal law).85 
Consider the following examples.  In 1933, Franklin Roosevelt 
declared a banking emergency that lasted into the 1970s.  In 1950, President 
Truman declared a national emergency that also lasted until the early 1970s.  
By the time those “emergencies” finally ended, the U.S. statute books 
contained roughly 470 pieces of legislation that provided the executive with 
some form of emergency power in particular circumstances.86 Myriad other 
statutes have nothing ostensibly to do with emergency power, but they 
follow what has become the “normal” model of providing relatively 
unconstrained delegations of lawmaking power or its equivalent from the 
legislature to the executive.87 
Because wartime is the most obvious state of exception, consider 
also the amount of time the U.S. has been at war in recent years.  After 
World War II, the U.S. entered almost immediately into a Cold War with 
the Soviet Union that lasted until 1989, with numerous sub-wars and proxy 
wars in Korea, Vietnam, Africa, the Middle East, and Central America.  The 
Gulf War against Iraq followed as soon as the Cold War ended, and after 
that swift victory, the U.S. remained on a military footing with respect to 
the Middle East that culminated in the second war against Iraq, as well as 
the war against Afghanistan (which can also be seen as part of an arguably 
separate war on terror).  Military occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq 
continues, not to mention the persistence for twenty-five years of a cold war 
with Iran.  The idea of war has also played out in domestic policy.  At least 
since the 1970s we have been embroiled in a war on crime that spawned an 
ongoing war on drugs and that overlaps with the new (old?) war on terror.  
The war metaphor has spilled over into other policy issues as well.  That is 
to say, the idea of war as a way of addressing social ills – by mobilization of 
resources, new structures of discretionary authority, and cutting through red 
 
85 See Gross, Normless and Exceptionless, supra note __, at 1858-60. 
86 See Lobel, supra note __, at 1404, 1408. 
87 See, e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
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tape that may include rights claims – has been normalized for quite some 
time. 
In short, although the exception may not be the norm in all areas of 
public life, it appears to be the norm in many areas, including national 
security and criminal law.  The process by which the exception becomes 
normal has an interesting effect on the legal rules that continue to apply to 
“normal” issues.  If, for example, constitutional rules relating to search and 
seizure or interrogation or communication between lawyer and client 
become looser in the context of drugs or terrorism, those looser rules will 
often apply across the board to other investigations and prosecutions that 
have little necessary connection with drugs or terrorism.88 
So, too, the social meaning of emergency power has changed, 
although the effort to trace the social meaning of government practices with 
any precision is difficult because different people and groups will have 
different sets of reactions, and these reactions will often be shaped by 
preexisting preferences or commitments and will change over time.  
Nonetheless, the growth of emergency and discretionary power means that 
the exercise of such power becomes expected (whether or not desired).  In 
the context of terrorism, the conduct of the United States, especially since 
9/11, has powerful, complex, and conflicting social meanings.  It reassures 
citizens that the government is resolved to protect them, and it may in fact 
disrupt terrorist networks, at least in the short term.  Even the willingness to 
cut corners and push against constitutional constraints can be interpreted as 
part of a deeply serious and formidable response to terrorism.  But 
opponents of the U.S. might interpret these moves as hypocritical or even as 
small victories, because they undermine our stated commitment to the rule 
of law.  Our actions also support the idea that U.S. political, economic, and 
political dominance of world affairs is neither benign nor disinterested but 
instead aggressively imperial and oppressive.  Yet whatever the cost, within 
our current political discourse the failure to act quickly, strongly, and at the 
boundaries of law would be almost unthinkable against what has become an 
expectation of action. 
The new criminal process, then, may not be so new.  Rather, it may 
be the latest step in a broad shift in our approach to governing, where 
pervasive authority is increasingly valued over the constraints of law.  This 
change is not a simple expansion, and it brings with it modification and 
dilution of rights, but also the possibility of their expansion within the 
context of also-expanded state power.  Nor is this change occurring without 
 
88 For a good discussion, see William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE 
L.J. 2137 (2002). 
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justification.  For reasons that surely include our own actions, terrorism is a 
real policy issue and a real threat, and rational, liberal-minded people 
support increased state power to counter the threat.  Be that as it may, the 
linkage of the new criminal process with the legal and conceptual problems 
associated with the normalization of emergency power means that state 
power over all of us – over our bodies, our mobility, our words and actions, 
and of course our lives – continues to increase.  And whether we like it or 
not, we may soon be unable to ignore the reality of “biopolitics,” or even 
what we might without irony come to call “constitutional biopolitics.”89 
For now, the critical point is that we are experiencing the modification of 
the processes by which our government investigates and imposes 
punishment on people, and the fact that some of these processes arise in the 
context of the war on terror means, not that those processes are about 
fighting terrorism, but rather that those processes – the new criminal 
process – inevitably will and have already begun to generalize. 
 
89 See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 119 (Daniel 
Heller-Roazen trans. 1998) (discussing “modern biopolitics: the politics of the great 
totalitarian states of the twentieth century”); BUTLER, supra note __, at 51-62 (discussing 
these ideas in terms of governmentality, sovereignty, and discipline); MICHEL FOUCAULT,
“SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1975-1976, at 
241, 245-47 (David Macey trans. 2003) (articulating the idea of biopolitics). 
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